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COLLECTION OF CAPTURED CHINESE COMMUNIST DOCUMENTS
ON AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

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1. GENERAL TACTICAL DIRECTIVES CONCERNING AMPHIBIOUS
 ASSAULT OPERATIONS ON THE CHOU-SHAN ISLANDS

Hq, Twenty-First Army
 Lin-hai
 2 November 1949

The amphibious operations to liberate Chou-shan have already taken place and the various units assigned to these operations have learned from bitter experience how stubbornly the KMT troops can resist and counterattack.

To obtain practical results from the maxim "Learn fighting by fighting," the cadres on the various levels must put greater emphasis and importance on

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the maxim itself. Although we have taken at great cost the Chin-t'ang, Ta-heng, and Tao-hua islands, we cannot boast and take pride in our accomplishments until Taiwan is finally liberated and the champion of imperialism, the US, is overthrown and chased out of the Pacific.

The only guarantee of victory is careful and detailed preparation. We cannot hope for sea and air aid from our friend the USSR. We must not neglect to understand our actual capabilities. We must not become boastful and belittle the enemy and forget our great cause. We must not relax. All of these things have a direct bearing on whether or not we will obtain victory in war. To annihilate the enemy remnants on Chou-shan completely and to carry out our historic and glorious mission, we must study the problems of preparations and tactics prior to going into combat as indicated below.

A. Preparations Prior to Combat

1. All levels of cadres must on their own utilize every possible method and all possible relationships, including research and investigation to obtain detailed information on the terrain (utilize fishermen and seamen on ships, who are comparatively acquainted with such matters), enemy situation, wind direction, and tides (differences in sea and river tides).

2. In amphibious operations, the problem is ships. The key to victory in our amphibious operations lies in whether or not we make satisfactory preparations in the matter of ships. For this reason we must do a thoroughly good job in preparing our ships and seamen in the following matters: (1) ships already assembled must first be carefully examined and every opportunity taken to make immediate repairs; (2) segregate ships by categories according to cargo capacity, size, etc., and organize them according to category; (3) send key cadres to strengthen the various levels of ship-control organizations, to supply officers for ships, and to strengthen the sense of responsibility of ships' crews; (4) control and training of civilian seamen must be aimed at making them politically conscious; particular emphasis must be placed on strengthening wartime controls and ensuring rations and supply; (5) in training seamen, train enough so that there will be no dependence on civilian seamen; and (6) every effort should be made to have equipment on ships complete along with reserve equipment (sails, oars, rudders etc., for sail boats and spare parts and oil for motor ships, etc.).

In the use and control of ships the following must be remembered: (1) taking into account the speed and type (sailboat, steamboat, motorboat, etc.), wind direction (head wind, favorable wind, side wind), tide (full tide, low tide, mean tide), weather (clear, cloudy, rain, fog, etc.), calculate accurately the route and speed; (2) after motor ships have deployed, wooden boats must be organized into landing units and any terrain feature or sea conditions utilized to make possible the landing of all troops; (3) specialists are responsible for coordinating with the helmsman the speed, time, and direction; (4) convoy formations must be triangular and distances between ships must be such that the ships are within sight of each other; and (5) sailing should be at night as much as possible. Drop anchor during the day. Suitable anchorages for this purpose must be located beforehand and ships must be dispersed and camouflaged or concealed to protect them against damage by enemy air attacks.

3. Activities of the rear services will include the supplying of ammunition and rations, evacuation of the wounded, and detention of prisoners of war. Preparations for these activities must be made beforehand and units organized to ensure supplies to the front lines.

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B. Amphibious Tactics

There must be firmly established in the minds of the soldiers a positive attitude of destroying the enemy and of advancing but not retreating.

1. Organize several spearhead units to make landings at the same time so that many key points along a wide stretch of the beach are secured (main landing and diversionary landings together; secret landing and landing in force together /sic/). Organization of units and disposition of troops must be such that the important points of the first wave can be reinforced. A large amount of ammunition must be carried to increase fire power so that after landing, units will not have to wait for reserve forces but can operate independently to consolidate their positions and expand. In long-distance amphibious operations there are limitations as to ships, tides, wind direction, etc., and reserve units cannot be dispatched within a short period of time. Therefore, the first-wave landing units must have the capacity of carrying on operations on their own.
2. In combat, strive to seek cover. Carry out sudden assaults to catch the enemy by surprise. To do this, maintain secrecy as to landing assault points. Maintain the secrecy of port of embarkation and staging area of troops. If necessary, use camouflage. Build a number of dummy jetties to confuse the enemy. The best times for troop embarkation and landing are just after twilight or before dawn.
3. After a landing has been made in one area, landings must be made in other areas swiftly and boldly. Hesitancy in attacking the enemy will result in disaster. Units already landed must defend their positions firmly and give cover to the landings of the second-wave units. When the enemy is confused, grab the opportunity to take the offensive and expand the combat front. Penetrate the enemy decisively and destroy his forces so that he will not have a chance to recover from the attack. With a portion of the troops, boldly skirt the enemy positions to cut off his retreat routes and restrict his possible use of harbors, jetties, and ships.
4. When a convoy encounters enemy ships, a small number of our ships must attempt to hold back the enemy ships and strengthen protection of the convoy flanks. The main part of the convoy must attempt to evade the enemy ships. The enemy will not be able to stop the convoy if it proceeds determinedly. Moreover, a moving target is not easy to hit. It is important that the ships in the convoy do not scatter. When our troops are to be transported, the estimates of the situation must be made for possible encounter with the enemy and appropriate measures taken for such an eventuality. An encounter with a small enemy force must not prevent the main strength from continuing on to its original objective.
5. In the matter of distribution of fire power, each company must have a certain amount of weapons for adequate fire power when landing. In addition, special ships with flat-trajectory artillery protected with sandbags can give cover to the landing forces in case enemy ships are encountered. Before our troops land, it is best to carry out low, parallel fire to destroy enemy fire points and directly aid our infantry landing operations. At the same time, the landing assault forces must supplement the artillery and must be responsible for prolonged fire, or be attached to artillery, following the infantry, and make gradual advances.
6. Each unit must increase command efficiency for night combat. There must be radio liaison training and night combat training of troops.
7. Special precaution should be taken against enemy air raids. Conceal and scatter. Use camouflage. Organize air warning units and special units for antiaircraft artillery and rifle fire.

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C. Radio Communications for Amphibious Operations

1. It is necessary that telecommunications equipment and personnel be kept at full strength for effective telecommunications liaison.
2. Signal regulations should be kept simple and uniform to avoid mistakes and complications.
3. Inspection will be made of all equipment to be used in maintaining liaison, such as flare guns, radios, telephones, signaling lamps, boat whistles, etc., and training exercises will be conducted in their use.

Since we are about to engage in a large-scale amphibious operation, it is hoped that all officers will take their duties seriously and will complete all necessary precombat preparations.

II. DIRECTIVES CONCERNING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS TRAINING AND PREPARATIONS

Hq, 61st Div

Because we are not familiar with the art of navigation, we are unable to prepare ourselves adequately for amphibious and landing operations. This is one of the greatest problems now confronting our forces. The following instructions are being issued, therefore, to overcome this handicap so that we may become proficient in this field:

The assembling of ships, training of seamen, and mobilizing of ships' crews must be emphasized and carried out by commanding officers.

The methods of assembling ships and mobilizing ships' crews must be improved. With regard to the latter, greater emphasis must be placed on training our own seamen rather than relying on mobilizing other ships' crews.

Each regiment must train more than 150 seamen, about 50 under each division. In the selection of seamen, not only technical qualifications, but also political reliability, combat courage, physical strength, and other pertinent factors must be taken into consideration. The cadres assigned to battalions down through platoons must uniformly organize themselves into seamen's units (exclusive of the above 150) for training.

Training must include the following:

1. For seamen -- In addition to training in general principles of navigation, seamen must be given actual training in the handling of sails, rudders, and oars, as well as lectures on assault tactics. Actual maneuvers must also be carried out to give them experience.
2. Cadres -- In addition to training cadres in all technical problems (cadres, unlike the seamen, must be thoroughly acquainted with all technical problems) and the organizational guidance of seamen, they must be given training in the effect of the wind and tides on the navigation of ships and formation of the convoy, and the organization and the control of troops embarking or being transferred from one ship to another.

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3. Ship formations -- Ship formations will be based on the size and the speed of the ships (subordinate formations may be separately organized). The crewmen assigned from land forces and the ships' crews must be definitely assigned to their respective ships in the organization of these formations. Two cadres (in case of necessity, this number may be increased) will be designated to assume command of the crew.

4. Each regiment must designate one ship as the lead ship which will be responsible for the uniform training of the seamen, mobilization and training of the ships' crews, placing of the ships in a convoy, repairing or replacing ships, etc. The cadres of the regiment will designate two men who will be placed in charge of organizing and directing these activities.

5. Before the 22d [no month or year given], the initial organization of the ship formations and assignments of the seamen must be completed, and the seamen must be assembled for training purposes. From the 24th to the 30th, all forces must be assembled for actual amphibious maneuvers so that they may fully prepare themselves for future operations.

A. Training

Training involves the following:

1. General Training in Navigation and Naval Indoctrination

This training is given the troops (cadres must study the methods of controlling the unit formation). Training materials may be reference materials on general navigation principles issued by the division.

2. Technical Education

Forces must train their men in firing of guns and in demolition activities.

3. Landing Operations

This is the most important phase. In addition to training men in combat ideology, the following points must be stressed: (1) fire support in landing operations; (2) unit formation; (3) tactics of capturing small enemy fortresses and bases, and proper measures against enemy counterattacks; and (4) control of forces (emphasis to be placed on maintenance of close communications, codes, and sentries' signs and countersigns, etc; special attention must also be given to train the troops in recognizing road signs, precautions in showing light, troops insignia, cadre liaison, etc.).

The schedule of training is as follows:

1. Before the 22d, aside from 1-2 days devoted to training on the general principles of navigation, the majority of the time must be devoted to training in landing operations, lectures on landing combat tactics, and actual landing maneuvers.

2. From the 23d through the 30th [sic], maneuvers in crossing the sea and landing operations must be carried out. The battalions will be given 4 days for three or four maneuvers, and the regiments 3 days for one to two maneuvers. During and after the maneuvers, training must be focused on the following problems: (1) Study of the terrain features and the selection of the landing points. (2) After the completion of a maneuver, discussions must be held to study the mistakes made during the maneuver, and another maneuver must be held. (3) Coordination of all large- and small-scale activities (for example, the activities of the battalion must be coordinated with those of the companies and the platoons).

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3. Technical training should be carried out during the early-morning calisthenics period.

B. Preparation of Equipment

1. Ammunition, communications equipment, lime, tung oil, hemp, hemp sacks, and medical supplies will be the responsibility of the division.

2. Ship repair equipment and spare parts, ladders, and other equipment will be the responsibility of each regiment. Since the appropriations have not yet been approved by the army, the expenditures of each regiment must be limited to one million yuan. Every effort must be made to economize on expenses, and, if possible, equipment (such as ladders, ship repair equipment and spare parts, etc.) which may be borrowed from other regiments must be borrowed by negotiations through proper channels.

C. Conclusions

The spirit of mutual dependence and protection between the ships' crews and the military forces must be developed. Political training must be given to the ships' crews. Since the ships' crews are much better qualified in technical problems, the commanders must respect their opinions and try to learn from them. By proper treatment of the ships' crews, it will be possible to win over their confidence and to have them fight side by side with us in the fulfillment of our duties.

Because we are now faced with the responsibility of performing many tasks in the shortest possible time, it is important that all forces emphasize training. They must organize themselves properly, assigning duties to individual or groups concerned so that they will be thoroughly acquainted with their tasks. The commanders must thoroughly plan out every detail to prevent any mistakes so that we may fulfill our responsibilities.

III. TACTICAL DIRECTIVE ON MEASURES TO BE TAKEN
TO NEUTRALIZE A COUNTERATTACK BY KMT FORCES

Hq, Twenty-Third Army

This directive was issued on the 16th /month and year not indicated/ by Headquarters, 23d Army, and was distributed to each unit for training and study. It resulted from a recent joint discussion by Sections 1 and 5 of the Staff Department, Headquarters, on tactical problems encountered during the Chou-shan Archipelago campaign. The text of the directive is as follows:

KMT forces have recently transported a number of light tanks from Taiwan to Ting-hai Island /main island in the Chou-shan Archipelago/. It is estimated that these tanks will be used to counterattack our landing forces when we begin operations against the island.

According to reports, the KMT has organized a unit of assault troops in the city of Ting-hai. These troops will be deployed at strategic spots on the island for the specific purpose of counterattacking our landing forces.

According to experience gained by other Communist units which have engaged in island operations on previous occasions, the KMT will have established counterattack positions from which a definite number of troops will be committed against us, once our assault forces have affected a landing.

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In view of the above situation, it is estimated that the KMT will definitely have a counterattacking force in readiness when we begin operations against Ting-hai. It is hoped, therefore, that as a precautionary measure, in view of present troop conditions, commanding officers on the various echelons will explore means by which still more effective measures may be taken to offset a KMT counterattack. In this connection the following points are raised for consideration by the commanders:

A. Command

1. It is our purpose to effect a successful landing; therefore, there must be no lack of fighting spirit and no faltering on the part of leaders when difficulties are encountered. The determination to overcome all difficulties must be instilled in every man.
2. Once a landing has been made by the assault forces, they must first secure a foothold and gain control of vantage points. Then they must speedily and boldly drive a deep wedge into the enemy lines. In this way the enemy troops may be cut up and destroyed without being allowed sufficient time to reorganize and engage in a systematic counterattack.
3. In making their landing, the assault troops will be covered by artillery fire. After the landing has been made and while the beach-head is being broadened, the artillery will continue to offer supporting fire to disrupt and create casualties among the enemy troops designated to conduct the counterattack.
4. In addition to boats for transporting attacking forces, it is also necessary that there be additional craft in reserve to transport reinforcements to the battle area at any time. These latter troops, being fresh, can be used to annihilate the enemy when he counterattacks. This maneuver, however, depends on the ability of our officers to utilize and control these fresh troops.
5. Preparations must be made for repelling repeated counterattacks by the enemy. Landing forces will therefore carry large amounts of ammunition, but will observe fire discipline and conserve their ammunition when engaged in combat. Our troops must also demonstrate their courage and strike hard and fast after landing. Available fire power will be concentrated, and troops will maintain their squad, platoon, and company formations. If the enemy counterattacks, he will be engaged in hand-to-hand combat so as to eliminate enemy troops to our immediate front. Then, while a portion of the troops stands firm, the remainder will push their advantage so as to annihilate the enemy completely.
6. Close liaison is encouraged between neighboring units in combat. When the commander of one unit is lost, that unit will of its own accord request the commander of the neighboring unit to assume his duties. Examples of such instances in the Ch'ang Chiang (Yangtze River) campaign must be disseminated, so that there will be no cases in which troops lack leaders, and vice versa. Integration of forces in such circumstances may take place at any time.
7. After the landing has been made, sufficient casualties may be suffered to upset troop formations. In such an event, command personnel will lead their troops to the flanks and regroup their forces in preparation for the enemy's counterattack.

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8. To neutralize a counterattack by the enemy, it is first necessary to become familiar with his troop strength and disposition and the terrain features in enemy territory. Prior to actual operations, therefore, these requirements must be the subject of a thorough investigation. After a landing has been made, forward units will send out patrols to determine the situation, and prisoners will be questioned whenever available. Information on enemy strength, unit designations, or tendencies to retreat will be reported immediately to higher headquarters.

B. Tactics

1. In the case of smaller islands, such as Ta-mao-shan, sufficient troops will be landed to take them by evening of the day of the landing. The enemy will be cleared from these islands so that they may not be used as a source of reinforcements for the counterattack on Ting-hai. If it is impossible to neutralize the smaller islands by that evening, the enemy will have an opportunity to sustain himself through the following day, and his capability for reinforcing the counterattack will be great, as in the case of Teng-pu Island. If the islands are occupied by the evening of the same day, the enemy's capability for making a new landing and counterattacking on the following day is not great. Aircraft and artillery will therefore be the only means available to him for inflicting casualties.

It is necessary that the spirit of continued fighting without thought of fatigue be instilled among our troops.

2. The most effective means of neutralizing an enemy counterattack are landing at several points, concentration of forces, and as much offensive action as possible. Organization is also important, and temporary regrouping points for use by our troops after landing must be determined before the actual start of operations.

3. Offense and defense must be closely coordinated, but the emphasis will be on offense. Only an active attack will disrupt the enemy's formations and render him incapable of launching an organized counterattack. In addition, a supporting force should be assigned the mission of securing vantage points, so that the main attacking force can broaden its position and penetrate enemy lines as quickly as possible.

4. The bold use of encirclement tactics is still more effective in neutralizing a counterattack. When the enemy launches his counterattack, and as we exert a fierce effort to inflict casualties from a frontal position, it is vital that experienced troops be sent to force the enemy to fall back, even though a significant portion of the troops be sacrificed.

C. Organization of Assault Forces

1. When Landings Are Made at Several Places

a. Assault squads, platoons, and companies should be organized as independent units, capable of overcoming the enemy's land defenses on their own initiative. They must deny themselves reliance on higher echelons, neighboring forces, or heavy weapons.

b. There will be a distinct division of responsibilities and number of troops among the officers in order to strengthen command on the lower levels. In this manner, lower echelons will be aware of the situation at all times and may organize themselves to deal with the enemy's counterattack.

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2. Weapons To Be Issued Assault Forces

a. Assault forces will be issued additional automatic weapons to offset their low troop strength. This additional fire power will enable them to inflict a large number of casualties on the enemy after landing and make it difficult for the enemy to organize for a counter-attack. When operating on mountainous terrain, assault forces will also carry large numbers of hand grenades and sticks of dynamite.

b. Front-line troops will be equipped with as many antitank weapons, such as antitank rifles, rocket launchers, and explosives, as possible. They will also be provided with high-trajectory weapons, such as the 60-millimeter mortar, for mountain operations. Mountain artillery will also be brought up behind the assault forces to support the infantry as it broadens its area of penetration.

3. Troop Strength for Assault Forces

a. Since several landings will be made in this operation, each as a separate engagement, it is necessary that assault units have full complements. Each squad will have at least 12 men, so that when casualties are suffered, operations will not be decisively affected.

b. Picked troops should be used as often as possible as officers and noncommissioned officers of assault units in view of the difficult nature of the operation.

IV. MOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER AND BATTLE PREPARATIONS

On the eve of the battle against Chou-shan, all the units under our command /East Chekiang Army/ must concentrate on battle preparations to carry out an effective assault against the enemy. In making such preparations, all the participating troops must be imbued with the spirit of "fighting to the glorious end."

Fortunately, most of our units are endowed with this spirit and realize the gravity of the impending operations. They are seriously making battle preparations, studying conditions of the sea, the sea routes to be taken, and the tactics to be used against enemy positions. This type of spirit, the responsibility for the fulfillment of war, and obligations to the Party should be maintained at all times to ensure ultimate victory.

However, there are still some units under our command whose morale is not up to standard. A slight change in the situation causes their determination to waver. For example, when there was a change made in the headquarters of the Ta-hsieh-tao (大 柵 島) Unit recently, doubts swept through the minds of some officers and men. Not knowing whether the shift in command would bring delay in battle and changes in assignments, the officers and men relaxed in their preparations for battle. This laxity plus impatience among troops frequently resulted in fights among the soldiers.

Summing up these shortcomings, some of the units (1) lack intelligent concepts about battles and the responsibilities involved therein; (2) do not realize the hardship which must be encountered and think that a landing on hostile shores will solve all problems; (3) do not realize that the weather will become cooler, the seas rougher, and that the enemy on Chou-shan is determined to "hold Ting-hai to the death."

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Such laxness among some of our troops interferes with our using valuable time before the battle in making preparations. These troops must realize that the longer we delay our landing operations on the main island of Chou-shan, the stronger the enemy will consolidate his defense.

The task of winning the battle against the Chou-shan islands is a glorious one and a difficult one. We must not falter, nor let a slight change in the situation shake our confidence. We must not relax our efforts. We must not create a sense of dependency on chances. The long and difficult preparations made by some 100,000 troops and civilians under the East Chekiang Army must not be in vain. The most important problem confronting us is to make further efforts in combat preparations, in mobilizing troops, and in raising the morale of our troops by overcoming laxity and impatience.

Each unit must, in accordance with its assigned duty, build up the attitude of taking the offensive and becoming thoroughly acquainted with the strategies and tactics to be used against the enemy, such as organizing crewmen, studying sea conditions, location of enemy defenses, methods of attacking enemy defenses or resisting enemy attacks, and putting equipment into fighting order.

Officers, especially those in command positions, must first examine themselves, eliminate any attitude of indifference toward the enemy, and proceed with all preparations. They must examine their ideas toward the war, tactics and strategies to be used in battle, and their determination to fight a long and difficult battle. The officers must study battle preparations of the other units. Through maneuvers and discussions they must determine practical means of conveying troops, landing on hostile shores, consolidating positions after landing, and making continual assaults against the enemy. The officers must also create a spirit of competition during the preparatory period. Finally, they must give meritorious awards to those who show excellent performance, and propagandize the glory of becoming revolutionary heroes.

V. HSIA-MEN AND CHIN-MEN ISLANDS OPERATIONS EXPERIENCES

After half a month of preparations we [identity not indicated] effected the historical landing on Hsia-men. Under extreme danger, our forces attacked and captured strategic points in the outer perimeter of Hsia-men and then proceeded to crush and annihilate the enemy.

The success of this operation was due to favorable sea conditions, the relaying of intelligence from our undercover agents in Hsia-men, and the selection of the right moment for the attack.

The following battle experiences during the Hsia-men and Chin-men operations may aid in future landing operations.

The success of the landing operation, during the Hsia-men invasion, was due to the thoroughness of preparations and the selection of the right moment for the assault. These two must go hand in hand. No matter how thorough the preparations, if the right moment for the attack is lost preparations will be in vain. Therefore, those in command should bear this in mind in future operations.

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Some of the essentials in carrying out an amphibious operation are proper organization of assault vessels, preparations for attack, and well-trained captains and crews (captains and those who are in command of vessels should be courageous, well-disciplined in political matters, and skillful in operation of their vessels). After the vessels have been assembled, they must proceed into the tactical areas and be arranged into assault formations of two or three echelons of gunboats, transports, and other vessels. After the vessels have been assembled properly in the tactical area, the speed of each vessel must be set and all equipment checked. For assault vessels, one sail-two mast or two sail-two mast type of small vessels, each capable of holding 12-15 men, should accompany two or three echelons of steamships (each loaded with two landing craft), large wooden vessels, and transports. The large wooden vessels are used for carrying heavy equipment. Engineers must accompany assault forces and support infantry units in landing operations.

A sufficient number of vessels must be requisitioned to accommodate all of the personnel. The first and second echelons must, at all times, maintain contact with each other. To meet language difficulties, young students from local guerrilla units should accompany and help as interpreters for ship crews.

Thorough studies based on experiences of the special characteristics of our forces as well as those of the enemy should be made before deciding on suitable tactics. For successful operations, the following must be considered:

1. Assault

Men should board vessels immediately after sunset and proceed toward hostile shores. The attack should be carried on during the night when effective cover can be had. When approaching enemy positions, the assault force must take assault positions and move swiftly in landing operations. Firing must be sudden, to overcome the superior fire power of the enemy, concentrating especially on enemy coastal guns. Firing should be concentrated also on assault points to cover infantry landings. During this operation firing should be continued unabated.

2. Diversionary Attack

Before attacking the main island, other strategic islands should be captured. For example, the battle against Chin-men was first carried out against large and small islands around it and then Chin-men was attacked and captured. The time element is important in utilizing these tactics. The operation against Hsia-men was carried out soon after the capture of other nearby islands. These tactics confuse the enemy and give him no time to prepare proper defenses.

3. Attack from Several Directions

The six spearhead attacks made against Hsia-men from three directions, proved these tactics effective. Special caution must be taken in these tactics not to let the wind disrupt liaison between units of two waves, as was experienced in the Hsia-men attack. One assault unit or wave must be composed of one army or one division, and after the landing is made, the unit must be able to consolidate its position and must be able to take independent action.

4. Wide Frontal Assault

This tactic calls for striking the weakest point in the enemy defense and effecting a break-through. Patrols must be sent to search out

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the weak spot. This attack is made from different directions with a series of irregular spearhead attacks. In carrying out this attack, plans must be made beforehand, and maintenance of liaison with other units is very important.

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